Op-Ed: China Plays It Smart in the Iran War

China Plays It Smart in the Iran War

by Mel Gurtov

852 words

China has played a cautious hand on Iran. It has chosen not to try to defend a country that is a major source of oil and officially a “comprehensive strategic partner.”

Instead, it has urged a diplomatic solution that will reopen the Strait of Hormuz and maintain adherence to international law, rather safe positions in line with China’s claim to be a “responsible great power.” Xi Jinping, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and other top Chinese officials have been quite critical of Trump, though without naming him, accusing the US of applying the “law of the jungle” and acting like a hegemon.

So far, that has not stopped Trump from planning to visit next week. But I can imagine that some of Trump’s advisers, worried about his weakened position at home and abroad, would be delighted if the trip were postponed a second time.

China has been very careful about helping in Iran’s defense. Beijing is assisting Iran in much the same way it has assisted Russia in the Ukraine war—by providing military support that falls short of finished weapons or other critical resources. When US intelligence accused China of planning to provide shoulder-held antiaircraft weapons, China denied the charge and Trump said that Xi assured him the report was false.

On the other hand, the Wall Street Journal reports that the “Chinese artificial-intelligence company MizarVision claimed on social media to have tracked the movements of American aircraft carriers, F-22 stealth fighters and B-52 bombers by using AI to analyze satellite data” (Chinese satellites over Mideast battlefield put US on edge). Whether or not China is providing Iran with this data is uncertain, but the Pentagon is said to be worried about commercial satellites putting militarily sensitive information before the public.

China’s Policy Begins at Home

Chinese leaders have always believed that foreign policy begins at home. China’s economy is not untouched by the war. It buys around 90 percent of Iran’s oil, which accounts for roughly 11-13 percent of China’s oil imports.

But China has other sources of oil, such as Russia via a direct pipeline and large strategic oil reserves. China also has plenty of coal and solar, wind, and nuclear power for electricity. The US has threatened sanctions against China’s so-called teapot oil refineries that account for a major share of its imports, aiming to further disrupt Iran’s economy. But China has responded with its own threats to sanction any bank, insurer, or shipping company that abides by the US sanctions.

The current state of China’s politics also calls for restraint on involvement in the Iran war. Xi has been engaged in major purges of the military and the communist party politburo as he continues a campaign to root out corruption and remove people judged insufficiently loyal to him.

The military purges have left a key decision-making group, the Central Military Commission, with only one other member besides Xi. It normally has seven members. And the politburo’s membership is down from 24 to 21. These possibly destabilizing developments would seem to take foreign policy adventurism off Xi’s agenda.

The Strategic Perspective

From an international perspective, China is reaping the benefits of Trump’s strategic disaster.

First, it poses as a peacemaker and protector of lawful activity in conformity with the UN Charter. Fu Cong, China’s permanent representative to the UN, called the US-Israel war “illegal” and said on April 28:

“Excessive use of military means cannot fundamentally resolve risks. Rather, it will exacerbate tensions and confrontation, and create even greater security crises. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, relevant international treaties and customary international law collectively form the foundation of today’s international maritime order. All countries should interpret and apply the convention fully, accurately, and in good faith, and refrain from selective application and double standards.”

Second, China’s view aligns with that of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states. They want the war to end ASAP, and they are among the important providers of oil to China. Playing peacemaker by urging an end to the US blockade, reopening of the Strait, and US-Iran dialogue is in tune with those countries’ policies.

Third, the war accords with China’s energy profile. Asia is being badly hurt by the shipping stoppage in the Strait of Hormuz. That is accelerating the region’s move to renewable energy sources, which China has made central to its energy exports under the Belt and Road Initiative.

China’s EVs are going to find an ever-larger market, for example in India, where Japanese, European, and US brands have dominated. Chinese solar and wind technology will also expand in Asia as it becomes plain that even when the oil starts flowing again, the energy paradigm may have permanently changed.

Countries look to China for help, and they’re getting it: “Shipments of jet fuel from China to Vietnam increased 34 percent, fertilizer exports to the Philippines rose 33 percent and diesel exports to the Philippines surged 187 percent in March, compared with the month before.”

Lessons Learned

What lessons might China be learning from the US-Iran war?

First, it has learned that the US behaves recklessly, just as it did in Vietnam, Libya, the Dominican Republic, and other interventions of past decades. An imperialist that hasn’t changed its stripes.

As Jonathan Czin, director on China affairs in Biden’s NSC, says in a New Yorker interview:

“I think as idiosyncratic and as different as Trump is from his predecessors, from Beijing’s perspective, there is a real through line of continuity across Administrations, Democratic or Republican, . . . So this is just, in their mind, the latest iteration of the same foreign policy and impulse in the Middle East which is bipartisan and spans Administrations, even to encompass Trump.”

Second, although China’s military leaders may give grudging admiration to the scope of US war-fighting capabilities, its political leaders may grimace at the thought of taking advantage of US preoccupation with Iran to try taking over Taiwan. As in past years, the Chinese pay close attention to US military tactics, but they also see serious obstacles to applying them in their own backyard.

In a word, Iran has shown that while it can’t match US firepower, it can cause the US major headaches. Taiwan, even without direct US intervention, could do the same. That is why China has shown so much interest in asymmetric warfare, such as cyber attacks that could in theory paralyze Taiwan without having to invade it. Besides, Xi recently scored a diplomatic coup by hosting Taiwan’s main opposition party leader, suggesting a diplomatic strategy to undermine the ruling party and a president whom Beijing detests.

On balance, Beijing decision makers probably see no reason to adopt a high-risk strategy on Taiwan or on Iran when the US is waging an aggressive war, expending military resources in the Middle East at a feverish clip, and inciting anti-war sentiment at home.

China looks like the responsible great power that can stabilize world energy markets and promote lawful behavior. If Trump thinks he holds all the cards, he’s in for a rude awakening.

 

Mel Gurtov, syndicated by PeaceVoice, is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Portland State University.